Defending democracy in the age of disinformation: the DSA test
European democracies face an unfamiliar challenge. The information environment in which citizens form political views, decide how to vote and discuss public affairs has been transformed by social media platforms operating at global scale and by foreign actors who have become adept at weaponising the resulting attention economy. The Digital Services Act, which became fully applicable in February 2024 for very large online platforms, provides the EU with a more substantial toolbox than any other major democracy to address these challenges. The question is whether Brussels has the political will to use it consistently.
What the DSA actually does
The DSA imposes obligations on online platforms scaled to their reach and influence. Very large online platforms and search engines must identify, assess and mitigate systemic risks they create, including risks to fundamental rights, democratic processes and public health. They must conduct annual independent audits of their compliance, share data with vetted researchers, and respond to the European Board for Digital Services. Crisis response mechanisms can be activated for serious threats to public security or health. The legal architecture is significantly more developed than the US approach, which relies primarily on self-regulation and Section 230 immunity, or the Chinese approach, which combines tight political control with selective enforcement.
The enforcement test
The first major DSA enforcement action came in late 2025 when X was fined 120 million euros for breaking the bloc’s digital rules on transparency. Investigations are ongoing into TikTok’s Rewards programme, AliExpress and Temu marketplace conduct, and Meta’s child safety practices. Each enforcement action carries political risk, given the geopolitical sensitivities now attached to digital regulation. The Trump administration has framed enforcement as economic warfare against US firms, and prominent platform owners have actively engaged in European political debates. The Commission’s posture has been to maintain enforcement while preserving the option of dialogue, but credibility ultimately rests on consistent application of the rules.
Why this matters beyond enforcement
Disinformation is not solved by content moderation alone. The DSA addresses one important piece of a wider puzzle that also includes media literacy, journalism business models, electoral law and the broader resilience of democratic institutions. The danger is that the DSA’s enforcement becomes a proxy for all of these challenges, with policymakers retreating from harder structural reforms because regulation is seen as the answer. The DSA is necessary. It is not sufficient. European democracies will need a sustained, multi-front response over years to maintain the integrity of public discourse. The DSA buys time. The question is whether the time is well used.
