Russia’s Africa strategy: trade lags, military influence grows ahead of Moscow summit

As Moscow prepares to host the third Russia-Africa summit on October 28 and 29, the Kremlin is intensifying its diplomatic push across the continent, framing its engagement as a ‘historic return’ after decades of Soviet-era ties. Russian foreign ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova has said that nothing and no one could be compared to what Russia did for Africa in the 20th century. Yet the economic reality remains modest: Africa accounts for just 3.9% of Russia’s foreign trade, and Moscow’s footprint is concentrated in a handful of northern states.

The summit, which follows earlier gatherings in 2019 and at roughly three-year intervals, will focus on economic cooperation alongside politics, security, science and culture. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has been visiting Africa increasingly often since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, as Russia seeks to build global support. But analysts note that Russia is actively working with only a few African countries, mainly in the north, a fact reflected in trade figures.

Egypt and Algeria dominate trade

Egypt is Russia’s most important African partner, accounting for around 39% of bilateral trade in 2025. Total trade between the two countries reached $10.5 billion (€9.4 billion), more than double the level in 2021, driven by Russian grain exports and metal industry products, while Egypt sends mainly fruit and vegetables. Russia is also building a large nuclear power plant at El-Dabaa on Egypt’s Mediterranean coast, financed by a $25 billion Russian loan covering about 85% of costs.

Algeria is another key partner, though the source material provides no specific trade figures. Ivan Klyszcz of the International Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn notes that South Africa, still Africa’s largest national economy, has a small trade volume with Russia, far less than Egypt or Algeria. He adds that Russian diplomats and business representatives are trying to extend relationships with Tanzania and Ethiopia, but with no appreciable success so far. Nikita Smagin, an expert on Russian policy in the Middle East, says Egypt is one of the few African countries with stable business relationships with Russia and extensive cooperation experience. In the long term, Egypt could become Moscow’s gateway to Africa and other markets, but Cairo pursues its own interests, and it would be too optimistic to hope for support purely out of political solidarity.

Limited economic weight compared to rivals

Russia’s total trade with all 54 African countries was around $27 billion in 2025, a fraction of the continent’s exchanges with other powers. The European Union remains Africa’s most important partner, with trade of around $385 billion, followed by China at over $348 billion, the United States at almost $105 billion, and India at $103 billion. Fidel Owusu, a Ghanaian expert with Geopolitical Intelligence Services, says Russia’s economic presence is not as significant as China, the US, India, or traditional powers like France and Britain.

Owusu adds that in recent times, some middle powers such as Turkey and the UAE are doing far better than Russia in terms of trade and investment. Beverly Ochieng, a senior analyst with Control Risks, notes that Western countries continue to dominate strategically important areas such as raw material extraction, finance and energy, even if their political presence is declining. She expects Russia to compete more intensively for access to critical minerals and energy projects, as seen with lithium projects in Mali and nuclear power initiatives across the continent.

Military presence and diplomatic weight

Russia’s footprint is far more visible in the military sphere than in trade. The Wagner Group first deployed mercenaries to support African regimes, particularly in the unstable Sahel, gaining access to raw materials in exchange. After the death of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, most operations were taken over by Africa Corps, a paramilitary group controlled by Russia’s defence ministry. The largest Russian contingents, each several thousand men, are in the Central African Republic, Mali and Libya, with efforts to expand into Burkina Faso and Niger, and sightings in Equatorial Guinea.

Irina Filatova of the University of Cape Town says the countries have sizeable deposits of minerals such as gold and uranium, and through them Russia can exert influence over Europe’s southern borders, including migration and regional security. Libya is an important logistical hub for connections with the Sahel and central Africa. Russia remains a major arms supplier to Africa, though its share fell during the war in Ukraine: from 21% in 2020-2024 to 15% in 2021-2025, putting it third behind the US (19%) and China (17%), according to SIPRI.

Despite modest economic ties, Moscow’s influence is amplified by food and fertilizer supplies and its military presence. Klyszcz argues that Russia’s influence in Africa is far greater than trade and investment volume alone would suggest. Owusu believes Russia sees the diplomatic weight of Africa: the continent has the largest number of countries, and Moscow wants that support in the UN General Assembly whenever votes are cast.